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I 
INTRODUCTION 
Most nations today participate in a dense network of international 
cooperation that requires them to grant authority to international actors. At 
varying levels this means that the individual state surrenders some autonomy to 
international bodies or other states by authorizing them to participate in 
decisionmaking processes and to take actions that affect the state. While some 
international agreements involve only commitments, in many cases they also 
include provisions that delegate some authority to a body to make decisions and 
take actions. The continued growth in international organizations and various 
standing bodies associated with international agreements suggests that states 
increasingly find international delegation useful in addressing the challenges 
associated with their growing interdependence. 
Although delegation is often present in international cooperation, there has 
been little systematic thinking about how delegation differs from other 
cooperation and how it varies across cooperative ventures. There is little 
analysis, for example, of what constitutes international delegation and what 
features of such delegation may be important for understanding its causes, 
consequences, and legal validity. A better conceptualization of the institutional 
features of delegation may be useful for understanding how states weigh the 
benefits and costs in making decisions concerning delegation. It may also be 
important in addressing the increasing concern with the legitimacy and 
accountability of global governance institutions.1 
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 1. See generally Daniel Bodanksy, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming 
Challenge for International Environmental Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 596 (1999); Ruth W. Grant & 
Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29 
(2005); Allen Buchanan & Robert O. Keohane, The Legitimacy of Global Governance Institutions, 20 
ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 405 (2006). 
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This article defines and clarifies the concept of international delegation from 
both a legal and a social-science perspective. In this respect, its approach is 
similar to that of The Concept of Legalization, by Kenneth Abbott, Robert 
Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter, and Duncan Snidal.2 
Although these authors properly treat international delegation as one 
component of legalization in international relations, delegation is worth 
considering separately because it raises unique issues. The factors that affect 
how one might classify international delegations may also differ from 
legalization more generally. Indeed, some factors may even weigh in opposite 
directions—for example, precision indicates a high level of legalization, but it 
may indicate a low level of delegation. 
The article begins by presenting a definition of international delegation as a 
grant of authority by two or more states to an international body to make 
decisions or take actions. Next, it describes the types of international bodies to 
which states may grant authority. Much of the work on international delegation 
to date has focused on grants of authority to bureaucracies and courts. While 
we of course include these grants of authority in our analysis, our focus is 
broader, in that it also includes grants of authority to collective bodies and 
subgroups of states. 
The article then identifies eight types of authority that states may grant: 
legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agenda-
setting, research and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation. 
International bodies will often exercise more than one type of authority, and 
there will sometimes be uncertainties about whether a particular type of 
authority falls into a particular category. Distinguishing between the different 
types of authority is important, however, because many of the existing 
arguments and theories about delegation may not apply equally across the 
different types of authority delegated. Failure to appreciate the variety in the 
types of authority delegated may therefore lead to misleading generalizations. 
Next, the article discusses how the extent of an international delegation can 
vary depending on its legal effect and the degree of independence of the 
international body. These factors have not yet been systematically explored, 
although they modify the nature of delegation in significant ways. After 
developing the typology, the article considers some of the benefits and costs of 
international delegation in light of this typology. The article concludes with a 
discussion of some of the questions raised by the typology and its implications 
for further research. 
 
 2. See Kenneth W. Abbott, Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, Anne-Marie Slaughter & 
Duncan Snidal, The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401 (2000). 
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II 
A DEFINITION OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 
For purposes of the typology developed here, we define international 
delegation as a grant of authority by two or more states to an international body 
to make decisions or take actions. Several aspects of this definition warrant 
clarification. 
A. A Grant of Authority 
The first part of this definition requires that there be a “grant of 
authority . . . to make decisions or take actions.” Grants of authority for 
international delegations are typically contained in the agreement that 
establishes the international body. The United Nations (UN) Charter, for 
example, contains various grants of authority to the main UN organs. If an 
international body acts outside of its grants of authority, it can be said to be 
acting ultra vires. This focus on a “grant of authority” is consistent with 
definitions of delegation in the political-science literature. Hawkins et al., for 
example, define delegation as “a conditional grant of authority from a principal 
to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former.”3 Similarly, 
in The Concept of Legalization, the authors define delegation to mean “that 
third parties have been granted authority to implement, interpret, and apply the 
rules; to resolve disputes; and (possibly) to make further rules.”4 
A grant of authority is what distinguishes a delegation from other exercises 
of authority. A nongovernmental organization, for example, may take actions 
that are similar to those taken by an international organization created by 
states, but unless the actions of the nongovernmental organization stem from a 
grant of authority from states, the actions do not involve an international 
delegation. 
The existence of such a grant of authority is also what distinguishes 
delegations from mere commitments. Most of the terms of international 
agreements concern commitments, through which states promise to behave in 
certain ways and to subject themselves to “scrutiny under the general rules, 
procedures, and discourse of international law, and often of domestic law as 
well.”5 To take just one example, the International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families spends its first seventy-one articles detailing the nature of these 
 
 3. Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation Under 
Anarchy: States, International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND 
AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 7 (Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. 
Nielson & Michael J. Tierney eds., 2006) (emphasis added). 
 4. Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 401 (emphasis added). 
 5. Id. 
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commitments.6 The following articles of the convention, however, establish a 
committee whose authority states can accept at varying levels.7 Thus, whereas 
commitments and delegations are distinct, delegations often occur in 
connection with international commitments, including commitments to comply 
with the decisions or actions of the international body. 
Our definition of international delegation does not require that the grant of 
authority give the international body powers to make decisions or take actions 
that are formally binding on states under international law.8 Instead, as with 
issue area, type of authority, and independence of the international body, the 
existence of legally binding authority is treated here as a variable that can affect 
the degree of delegation.9 Under this approach, an international delegation will 
exist even when states have granted an international body the authority to issue 
only nonbinding resolutions, policy proposals, or advisory opinions. 
Nevertheless, under this definition some international cooperation will not 
involve delegations. For example, despite their potential importance, the annual 
“Group of Seven” or “Group of Eight” summits involve at most a minimal 
delegation. Leaders from the member countries meet annually to discuss and 
potentially reach agreements on economic and political issues,10 but they have 
not granted any authority to the collective in advance. Similarly, multilateral 
treaty conferences, at which representatives of states meet to draft and 
negotiate proposed treaties, do not involve international delegations because 
there has been no grant of authority to make decisions or take actions on behalf 
of the states parties. Although treaty conferences may result in the 
promulgation of a proposed treaty, such a proposal is made only on behalf of 
the states affirmatively endorsing the treaty, not the collective of states 
attending the treaty conference.11 
Finally, unlike definitions of international delegation that focus on a 
principal–agent model,12 our definition does not specifically require that the 
 
 6. International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and 
Members of Their Families, G.A. Res. 45/158, arts. 1–71, U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/45/158 (Dec. 18, 1990). 
 7. Id. at arts. 72–78. 
 8. Cf. Edward T. Swaine, The Constitutionality of International Delegations, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 
1492, 1494 & n.3 (2004) (defining delegation to international institutions as “vesting them with the 
authority to develop binding rules,” and noting that “the authority so vested must be capable of some 
kind of legal effect on the international or domestic plane: something more than mere pronouncements 
or hortatory acts”). 
 9. See also Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 415–16 (treating the binding nature of the international 
body’s actions or decisions as a variable). 
 10. See G8 Information Centre, What is the G8?, http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2007). 
 11. By contrast, the treaty-drafting work of the United Nation’s International Law Commission 
can be seen as involving an international delegation. In promulgating the proposed treaties, the 
Commission is exercising the General Assembly’s authority (which the Assembly redelegated to the 
Commission) to “encourag[e] the progressive development of international law and its codification.” 
U.N. Charter art. 13, para. 1(a); International Law Commission, http://www.un.org/law/ilc/ (last visited 
Aug. 31, 2007). 
 12. See HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3. 
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grant of authority be conditional. Although international delegations typically 
are conditional,13 the limits imposed on the exercise of delegated authority and 
the circumstances under which delegated authority can be revoked will vary. As 
a result, conditionality is treated here as part of permanence of commitment, a 
variable that relates to the legal effect of the delegation. 
B. By Two or More States 
This article focuses on delegations by two or more states. The definition of 
international delegation therefore does not cover delegations made by only one 
state—for example, a delegation by a state to a private contractor. Although 
such single-state delegations will sometimes be international in the territorial 
sense, they do not implicate the same interstate cooperation issues implicated 
by delegations that involve two or more states. 
The delegation from states to an international body is typically part of a 
longer “chain of delegation,”14 as illustrated in Figure 1. There is also, generally, 
a prior domestic link within each state, because international delegation is itself 
the product of delegation within the state, for example, from citizens to a 
legislative body, or from a legislative body to an executive body. The analysis 
here does not focus on such domestic delegation, although it recognizes that 
international delegation raises interesting domestic issues both legally and 
politically. 
Our definition of international delegation does include redelegation, 
however, because it also emanates from states, albeit indirectly. After states 
delegate to international bodies, these bodies often have the power to 
redelegate that authority to other international bodies or to other actors such as 
nongovernmental organizations. For example, the UN Secretary-General may 
delegate authority by appointing working groups or councils to assist his or her 
work on issues ranging from Internet governance to the protection of civilians 
in armed conflict. Redelegation is therefore a type of authority that states may 
grant, and the exercise of this redelegation authority is itself an international 
delegation. 
 
 
 
 13. For a discussion of the circumstances under which states are allowed to withdraw from treaties, 
see generally Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579 (2005). 
 14. For discussion of chains of delegation, see, for example, Torbjörn Bergman, Wolgang C. Müller 
& Kaare Strøm, Parliamentary Democracy and the Chain of Delegation, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 255, 257–
59 (2000). See also Daniel L. Nielson & Michael J. Tierney, Delegation to International Organizations: 
Agency Theory and World Bank Environmental Reform, 57 INT’L ORG. 241 (2003). 
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Figure 1: Delegation Chain 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although the focus here is on delegation by states, the definition includes 
grants of authority that would not otherwise be exercised by a state.15 States 
often engage in international delegation to address collective-action problems 
that they cannot address individually. Some delegations, therefore, are not of 
preexisting state authority, but of authority created among states. An 
international adjudicative institution, for example, may exercise dispute-
resolution authority that could not be exercised by any one state. Nevertheless, 
the exercise of such authority stems from grants of authority by individual 
states. 
C. To an International Body 
Our definition uses the term “international body” to broadly signify some 
entity to which states have granted authority to make decisions or take actions. 
This includes any entity created by states, including a typical bureaucracy, 
temporary commission, council of states, board of directors, or even conference 
of parties. The concept of “international body” is therefore broader than that of 
“international organization,” because international bodies need not have “a 
concrete and stable organizational structure and a supportive administrative 
 
 15. For an example of an approach that excludes such authority, see DAN SAROOSHI, 
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR EXERCISE OF SOVEREIGN POWERS 28–32 (2005) 
(focusing on the conferral of sovereign state powers on international organizations). See also Julian G. 
Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to International Organizations: New Problems with Old Solutions, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 72 (2000) (“An international delegation is the transfer of constitutionally-assigned 
federal powers . . . to an international organization.”). 
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apparatus.”16 Bodies may have these attributes, but they may also exist only 
temporarily, such as a task-specific commission or an arbitral tribunal. Multiple 
international bodies may also be nested within any given international 
organization. For example, the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention) establishes the 
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which contains a 
Conference of Parties, a Technical Secretariat, and an Executive Council.17  
The definition of international delegation here includes grants of authority 
by states to a collective or subgroup of states, or what some scholars have 
referred to as a “pooling of sovereignty.”18 Although our inclusion of pooling 
arrangements may contrast with some delegation literature, which defines 
delegation as a grant of authority to “an agent,”19 it is in line with other 
delegation literature, including that which speaks of external and internal 
delegation by Congress, the latter being delegation to standing committees and 
subcommittees within each of the legislative chambers.20 Barbara Koremenos 
also speaks of internal and external delegation and notes, for example, that 
states sometimes delegate dispute-resolution authority to a subgroup of 
member states. 21 
The congressional committee analogy may be particularly apt with respect 
to international delegations. As one commentator notes, 
[a]rguably, delegation to congressional committees, composed of a subset of the 
membership, more closely matches circumstances at the international level than does 
delegation to large, autonomous bureaucracies, which have fewer analogs among 
 
 16. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Why States Act Through Formal International 
Organizations, 42 J. CONFLICT RES. 3, 4 (1998). 
 17. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of 
Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction art. VIII, ¶ B(21)(k), Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800, 1974 
U.N.T.S. 45, available at http://www.opcw.org/html/db/cwc/eng/cwc_frameset.html 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]. 
 18. European Union (EU) scholars in particular have labeled delegation to collective bodies as 
“pooling of sovereignty” rather than delegation, because these delegations do not raise the same 
principal–agent issues raised by delegations to international bureaucracies. See, e.g., Shirley Williams, 
Sovereignty and Accountability in the European Community, 61 POL. Q. 299, 302 (1990); see also MARK 
A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA 
SETTING IN THE EU (2003) (focusing on EU institutions that are separate from the member states and 
not on the European Council or the Council of Ministers). 
 19. Hawkins et al., for example, define international delegation as “a conditional grant of authority 
from a principal to an agent that empowers the latter to act on behalf of the former.” HAWKINS ET AL., 
supra note 3, at 7. In the same volume, Lisa Martin notes, “In the case of the IMF, I simplify by 
assuming that the EB [Executive Board], which directly represents member states, is the principal, and 
that the management and staff (treated as a unitary actor) is the agent.” Lisa Martin, Distribution, 
Information, and Delegation to International Organizations: The Case of IMF Conditionality, in 
HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 140, 142. 
 20. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION: 
CONGRESSIONAL PARTIES AND THE APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1–21 (1991). 
 21. Barbara Koremenos, Bringing More ‘Precision’ to the Three Dimensions of Legalization 
(2005) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). 
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international institutions. Similar to these committees, [international organizations] 
are composed of a subset of states in the international system.22 
Following this logic, states are considered here to have granted authority to a 
council or board that may be part of the international body but composed only 
of a subgroup of member states. This holds even for states that sit on a board or 
council, since they are still granting the board or council authority to make 
decisions or take actions. An example is when states act through the UN 
Security Council. Nonmembers of the Council clearly are delegating authority 
to the Council to make binding decisions. Council members without a veto are 
also engaged in international delegation under this definition, because the 
Council can act even over their objection. Even veto-wielding members are 
delegating an authorization role to the Council (for example, to approve certain 
uses of military force), a role that is a type of legislative authority.23 
Similarly, individual states may grant authority to a conference of parties, 
which itself is nested within the larger international body and oversees the work 
of other organs within that body. For example, within the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Conference of Parties can make 
decisions on matters of substance by a two-thirds majority.24 Its responsibilities 
include approving draft agreements, provisions, and guidelines developed by 
the Organization’s Preparatory Commission. Additionally, the Conference of 
Parties oversees enforcement of the Chemical Weapons Convention and has 
authority to “take the necessary measures to ensure compliance and to redress 
and remedy any situation which contravenes the provisions of this 
Convention.”25 In some cases, regular meetings of the parties may be the only 
“body” created by the delegation. This is the case, for example, in the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Landmines Convention).26 
A private body or a public–private partnership can also be an international 
body if states have granted some authority to that body. For example, the 
European Commission has mandated that all European Union (EU) member 
states follow the standards of the International Accounting Standard Board, an 
independent, privately funded body that sets international financial reporting 
standards.27 Private bodies such as nongovernmental organizations and 
 
 22. Alexander Thompson, Coercion Through IOs: The Security Council and the Logic of 
Information Transmission, 60 INT’L ORG. 1, 6 (2006). 
 23. See infra Part III. 
 24. Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at art. VIII, ¶ B(18). 
 25. Id. at art. VIII, ¶ B(21)(k); see also id. at art. XII, ¶ 4. 
 26. See generally Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer 
of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 [hereinafter 
Landmines Convention], available at http://untreaty.un.org/English/millennium/law/disarmament/ 
xxvi_5E.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2008). 
 27. See generally Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
19 July 2002, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/ 
en/oj/2002/l_243/l_24320020911en00010004.pdf (regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on the application of international accounting standards); see also Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, 
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corporations promulgate the vast majority of standards and codes of conduct;28 
in situations in which they receive their authority from states, there is an 
international delegation. 
Table 1 illustrates some of the different types of international bodies to 
which states may grant authority. 
 
Table 1: Types of International Bodies 
 
Type of Body Examples 
Collective Bodies Conference of Parties 
or Committee or 
Council of the Whole 
in which all are 
members. 
Meeting of state parties 
under the Kyoto 
Protocol, the 
International Criminal 
Court treaty, or the 
Landmines Convention; 
the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation 
in Europe; the European 
Council. 
Subgroups Council or board on 
which not all are 
members. 
World Bank Board of 
Directors;  
UN Security Council; 
UN Human Rights 
Council. 
External and 
independent. 
International Court of 
Justice; collective 
redelegation from one 
UN agency to another; 
International Accounting 
Standards Board. 
Third Parties or Agents 
Hired staff or 
bureaucracy. 
Secretariats and 
implementing agencies of 
various kinds, such as 
under the World Health 
Organization and the 
United Nations 
Development Program. 
 
 
Global Private Governance: Lessons from a National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 225, 227–28, 250–59 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
 28. See ANS KOLK & R. VAN TULDER, INTERNATIONAL CODES OF CONDUCT: TRENDS, 
SECTORS, ISSUES AND EFFECTIVENESS (2002). 
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III 
TYPES OF DELEGATED AUTHORITY 
This Part describes eight types of delegated authority: legislative, 
adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agenda-setting, research 
and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation.29 International bodies 
often exercise more than one type of authority. The UN Security Council, for 
example, has arguably been granted both legislative and enforcement 
authority.30 In addition, there are sometimes uncertainties about whether an 
international body has been granted a particular type of authority,31 or whether 
a particular type of authority falls into one or another category. Finally, the 
scope of an international body’s authority will sometimes change over time. 
This can happen formally, as a result of amendments to the underlying treaty 
establishing the body, or informally as a result of changes in how the body 
construes its mandate. It can also happen as a result of changes in the world—
for example, when changes in technology make the subject area of a delegation 
(such as seabed mining or space development) more important. 
A. Legislative Delegation 
A legislative delegation grants authority to create or amend treaties (not 
including regulatory schedules or annexes attached to the treaties, which are 
classified below under regulatory delegation) or issue-binding directives. For 
example, in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), some amendments can 
take effect over objections—as long as eighty-five percent of total voting power 
favors the amendment. Similarly, the UN Charter can be amended for all 
parties based on the vote and ratification of two-thirds of the parties (including 
the five veto members of the Security Council). The UN Security Council can 
issue binding resolutions relating to peace and security, and EU institutions can 
issue directives binding on EU countries. Legislative delegation, although 
relatively rare, is important to legal scholars, because it may disturb the 
constitutionally mandated distribution of authority in some countries or even 
 
 29. This list is not exhaustive. It omits some types of delegation, such as when states allow other 
states or bodies to represent them, either for diplomatic reasons, or, as in the EU, when states allow the 
trade commissioner to negotiate on their behalf. 
 30. See U.N. Charter art. 25, para. 1 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and 
carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”); id. at art. 39, 
para. 1 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
 31. For example, there was some uncertainty surrounding the Security Council’s authority to 
establish international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda. See Prosecutor v. 
Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 
(Oct. 2, 1995), reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 32, 32–34 (1996). Similarly, there has been significant controversy 
over whether the committee that was established to monitor compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has the authority to determine the validity of state reservations 
to the Covenant. In a general comment issued in 1994, the committee claimed that it had this authority, 
a claim that was challenged by several states, including the United States. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack 
L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional Consent, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 399, 429–37 (2000). 
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warrant constitutional amendments, as has been the case with several European 
countries during the course of European integration with the EU. Political 
scientists also care about the delegation of legislative authority because its legal 
implications raise questions about when and why states will make such 
delegation and with what effects. 
Legislative delegations typically encompass the authority to mandate state 
compliance with certain requirements, but they can also encompass the 
authority to authorize state conduct. Under the UN Charter, for example, states 
are prohibited from using military force against other states except in self-
defense.32 The Security Council, however, has the authority to authorize states 
to use nondefensive force and thereby render what would have been illegal 
conduct into legal conduct.33 
B. Adjudicative Delegation 
Adjudicative delegation grants authority to make a decision about a 
controversy or dispute. The term adjudicative does not mean that the decision 
must be binding. Many agreements provide for informal mediation, nonbinding 
arbitration, or advisory opinions. States do, however, often delegate binding 
adjudicative authority to permanent or ad hoc courts, or to issue-specific 
arbitral bodies (such as the Iran–U.S. Claims Tribunal and the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Chapter 11 and Chapter 19 arbitrations). In 
addition, states commonly delegate internally to the member states of a given 
agreement by providing procedures for resolution of compliance issues or other 
disagreements relating to the agreement.34 
Adjudicative authority, whether it is granted to courts, tribunals, or ad hoc 
internal bodies, may cover interstate disputes, disputes between a state and an 
international organization, disputes between institutions within an international 
organization, disputes between private parties and states, or disputes between 
private parties and international organizations.35 The International Court of 
Justice (ICJ), for example, has binding dispute-resolution authority only with 
respect to disputes between states. By contrast, the European Court of Human 
Rights can adjudicate disputes between private parties and states.36 
International criminal tribunals (such as the International Criminal Court) 
exercise yet another form of adjudicative authority, addressing disputes 
between the international community and individuals. 
 
 32. See U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51. 
 33. See UN Charter art. 42. 
 34. See Barbara Koremenos, An Economic Analysis of International Rulemaking (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author). 
 35. See Karen J. Alter, Delegating to International Courts: Self-Binding vs. Other-Binding 
Delegation, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 37 (Winter 2008).  
 36. Keohane et al. usefully distinguish between traditional interstate dispute resolution, in which 
states are conceived as unitary actors, and transnational dispute resolution, which is open to individuals 
and groups in civil society. See Robert O. Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik & Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and Transnational, 54 INT’L ORG. 457, 457–58 (2000). 
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International adjudication can overlap with, and even directly interact with, 
domestic adjudication. National courts in the EU, for example, are often 
required to seek preliminary rulings from the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
concerning EU law and to apply those rulings in cases before them. The ICJ has 
issued a series of decisions relevant to U.S. criminal adjudication, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court recently had to consider what weight to give to those decisions.37 
Furthermore, several years ago a Chapter 11 NAFTA arbitration panel 
considered whether a state trial court’s civil adjudication in the United States 
violated U.S. treaty obligations under NAFTA.38 
C. Monitoring and Enforcement Delegation 
Monitoring and enforcement delegation grants authority to take measures 
to monitor or enforce compliance with state commitments.39 Although different 
in nature, monitoring and enforcement are both designed to induce compliance 
with international obligations. Monitoring authority can range from voluntary 
reporting standards to mandatory on-site inspections, and can be carried out 
either by a standing body (such as the International Atomic Energy Association 
or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) or on an ad hoc 
basis (as under the Landmines Convention).40 Some monitoring authority 
enables the body only to collect and distribute the information, while other 
bodies have the authority to determine and declare whether a state is in 
compliance. Classic examples of monitoring delegations are the many human 
rights and environmental treaties that create bodies to which member states 
become obligated to submit regular reports. 
As part of monitoring and enforcement delegation, states may also grant 
authority to an international body to launch investigations into the conduct of 
individual member states. For example, in 2005 the Council of Europe 
Parliamentary Assembly opened an investigation into allegations about the 
existence of secret Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) detention centers in 
member states.41 Soon thereafter, the Secretary General of the Council of 
Europe, Terry Davis, acting under Article 52 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights,42 sent a questionnaire to the forty-five states parties to this 
 
 37. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669, 2682–88 (2006) (giving only “respectful 
consideration” to an ICJ decision). 
 38. See U.S. Department of State, The Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3755.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). See generally Ernest A. Young, 
Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143 (2005) (discussing the 
Loewen case). 
 39. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 16, at 27 (discussing various methods of enforcement used by 
international organizations). 
 40. See Landmines Convention, supra note 26, at art. VIII. 
 41. Council of Europe, Alleged Secret Detentions in Council of Europe Member States, 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Events/2006-cia/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2007). 
 42. Article 52 of the European Convention on Human Rights states that the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe may request “any High Contracting Party . . . [to] furnish an explanation of the 
manner in which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of any of the provisions of this 
Convention.” Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 
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convention. After the Secretary General released his report, the European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (the Council of Europe’s advisory 
body on constitutional matters) published its opinion on the international legal 
obligations of Council of Europe member states concerning secret detention 
facilities and interstate transport of prisoners.43 Many treaties hold similar 
provisions that allow the launch of investigations, and states are often legally 
obligated to cooperate with such investigations. For example, the International 
Labour Organization governing body may refer complaints about 
noncompliance by member states to a Commission of Inquiry,44 and member 
states have agreed to “place at the disposal of the Commission all the 
information in their possession which bears upon the subject-matter of the 
complaint.”45 
There is a wide range of enforcement authority. Often, the enforcement 
authority of international bodies is “soft” in that it involves primarily the 
mobilization of peer pressure to induce state compliance.46 This is true, for 
example, of most human rights monitoring bodies. In practice, this has also 
been the case for the International Court of Justice; although the Security 
Council can in theory enforce decisions of the Court, it has never done so.47 
Sometimes, enforcement may take the more tangible form of a withdrawal of 
voting power, membership, or institutional benefits. Members of the UN, for 
example, can lose voting rights in the General Assembly if they fail to pay 
dues.48 
Some international bodies can exercise “strong” forms of enforcement. The 
Security Council can use coordinated economic, trade, or even military 
sanctions. The International Criminal Court has the authority to imprison 
individuals who commit certain types of international crimes. Some monitoring 
and enforcement involves police-type authority that allows intrusions on the 
territory of a state. This is the case, for example, under the Chemical Weapons 
Convention.49 The enforcement authority of an international body can be 
 
1950, E.T.S. 5, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (formerly art. 57, amended by Protocol No. 11 to the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, May 11, 1994 (Nov. 1, 
1998), E.T.S. 155, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 960 (1994)). 
 43. Council of Europe—Venice Commission, Opinion on the International Legal Obligations of 
Council of Europe Member States in Respect of Secret Detentions Facilities and Inter-State Transport 
of Prisoners, 66th plen. sess., CDL-AD(2006)009 (Mar. 17–18, 2006), available at 
http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)009-e.pdf. 
 44. International Labour Organization, Constitution art. 26, ¶¶ 2–3, available at 
http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/english/constq.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2008). 
 45. Id. at art. 27. 
 46. The political-science literature discusses, for example, social influence and shaming. See, e.g., 
Alastair Iain Johnston, Treating International Institutions as Social Environments, 45 INT’L STUD. Q. 
487, 499–501 (2001). 
 47. See generally SHABTAI ROSENNE & YAEL RONEN, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT, 1920–2005 (2006). 
 48. See U.N. Charter art. 19. 
 49. See Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 17, at Annex on Implementation and 
Verification. 
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substantially enhanced if its orders or decisions have direct domestic effect, as is 
the case, for example, with the decisions of the European Court of Justice.50 
D. Regulatory Delegation 
A regulatory delegation grants authority to create administrative rules to 
implement, fill gaps in, or interpret preexisting international obligations. Like 
legislative authority, regulatory authority affects international obligations and 
therefore raises important legal considerations. For example, the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) has the power to adopt binding interpretations of the 
various WTO trade agreements by a three-fourths vote.51 Other organizations 
have the authority to amend their regulatory annexes and schedules.52 
As can be the case in domestic law, there may be uncertainties associated 
with the distinction between legislative and regulatory delegations. When does 
regulation become so extensive or removed from the original treaty that it 
amounts to legislation? This can matter to domestic law, which may require a 
particular domestic process for new treaty commitments. Regulatory 
delegations also may raise questions for legal scholars about the extent to which 
domestic administrative-law concepts should be applied to the international 
arena.53 In addition, such delegations may be of interest to political scientists 
studying the circumstances under which international institutions stray from 
their original mandates. 
E. Agenda-Setting 
The delegation of agenda-setting authority allows an international body to 
formally set or control the legislative agenda of an international body or of 
member states. Formal agenda-setting power refers to “the ability of a given 
actor to initiate policy proposals for consideration among a group of legislators” 
and includes the ability of actors to keep certain items off the agenda.54 
Formal agenda-setting power depends on several institutional features such 
as who may propose an initiative, the voting rules, and the rules governing 
amendments.55 For example, an international body may have the right of 
 
 50. See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW 17–20 (2001). 
 51. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization art. IX(2), Apr. 15, 
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154 (“The decision to adopt an interpretation shall be taken by 
three-fourths majority of the Members.”). 
 52. See generally Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Specialized Law-Making Processes, in 1 UNITED NATIONS 
LEGAL ORDER 124–35 (Oscar Schachter & Christopher C. Joyner eds., 1995). 
 53. See generally Symposium, The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 1 (Summer/Autumn 2005); Symposium, Global Governance and Global Administrative Law in 
the International Legal Order, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1–278 (2006); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at 
the Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490 (2006). 
 54. Mark Pollack, Delegation, Agency and Agenda Setting in the European Community, 51 INT’L 
ORG. 99, 104 (1997). On formal agenda-setting power within the United States, see also Kenneth A. 
Shepsle, Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models, 23 AM. J. 
POL. SCI. 27 (1979), and KIEWIET & MCCUBBINS, supra note 20. 
 55. Pollack, supra note 54, at 121. 
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initiative, as is the case with the European Commission, which has the sole right 
to initiate legislation in the EU. The actions of an international body may also 
obligate states to consider certain issues on their domestic legislative agenda. 
For example, members of the International Labour Organization are required 
to bring conventions adopted by the Organization before their domestic 
authorities “for the enactment of legislation or other action.”56 The 
Organization also controls what treaties get proposed under the convention. 
This formal or procedural agenda-setting power is distinct from what has 
been labeled substantive or informal agenda-setting power.57 Informal agenda-
setting power is the general ability of many different types of actors to influence 
the substantive agenda of an international body or the international community 
more broadly by bringing attention to a particular issue in a way that may 
indirectly influence the formal agenda. Informal agenda-setting power may be 
the consequence of other forms of delegation, but it is not itself deliberately 
granted, so it is not included here under the concept of delegation. 
F. Research and Advice 
A grant of research and advice authority permits an international body to 
gather information about a topic and possibly to issue recommendations, 
opinions, or interpretations. Research and advice is by definition not binding, 
although the reports and findings of the international body may by mandate be 
entitled to discussion in a designated forum. 
Sometimes research and advice delegations are temporary and ad hoc. For 
example, during the recent efforts to reform the UN, the UN Secretary-General 
appointed a group of eminent experts, as is often done within the UN.58 He also 
established a Working Group on Internet Governance to investigate and make 
proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of the Internet by 2005.59 
Other recent advisory delegations include the Advisory Committee for the 
Secretary-General’s in-depth study on violence against women. The mandate 
instructs the committee to conduct an in-depth study on the types, incidences, 
causes and consequences of violence against women globally; to solicit 
information on best practices from member states; and then to “submit a 
 
 56. ILO Constitution, supra note 44, at art. 19, ¶ 5(b). See Laurence R. Helfer, Monitoring 
Compliance with Unratified Treaties: The ILO Experience, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 200 (Winter 
2008).  
 57. For an excellent discussion and literature review of formal versus informal agenda-setting 
power, see Pollack, supra note 54, at 121–28. 
 58. See Reform at the United Nations, http://www.un.org/reform/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 59. See National Telecommunications and Information Administration, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2008). The working group’s report recommended the creation of a Global Internet 
Council consisting of governments and involved stakeholders to take over the U.S. oversight role of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, and recommended that several other 
international bodies manage the Internet. However, right before the report came out, the United States 
stated that it wished to maintain its sole authorizing role. Subsequently, the Secretary-General 
established a small Secretariat in Geneva to assist in the convening of “the Internet Governance 
Forum,” a body that came out of the working group. See Internet Governance Forum, 
http://www.intgovforum.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2007). 
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report . . . to the General Assembly at its sixtieth session[,] . . . including action-
oriented recommendations, for consideration by States, encompassing, inter 
alia, effective remedies and prevention and rehabilitation measures.”60 The 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development also serves 
extensive research functions through, for example, its Directorate for Science, 
Technology, and Industry. 
Advisory delegations may also be long-term. For example, the Secretary-
General may create standing advisory bodies such as the Council of 
Development Advisers, proposed in his March 21, 2005, speech to the General 
Assembly.61 Advisory bodies may even become formal and permanent 
intergovernmental organizations. For example, in 1988 the World 
Meteorological Organization and the UN Environment Programme established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The IPCC does not 
itself conduct research, but it assesses existing research and issues reports that 
include “options for adaptation and mitigation.”62 
G. Policy Implementation 
States often grant international bodies authority to implement policies. The 
World Bank, the IMF, the World Health Organization, and many other UN 
agencies have authority to expend and allocate resources to carry out agreed-
upon programs and projects, including internal administrative tasks. Like other 
forms of policy implementation, the delegation of spending power (including 
lending power) entails opportunity costs in terms of what other policies the 
state might have been able to autonomously create. From the perspective of 
political science, this category of delegation is important, because it is often 
created to optimize the provision of public goods when states benefit from the 
pooling of resources. Delegating policy implementation poses fewer issues for 
legal scholars because it does not involve the creation of legally binding rules or 
decisions and because there tend to be fewer domestic restraints on the 
delegation of implementation authority than on that of other authorities. 
Nevertheless, delegating policy implementation can be politically contentious, 
as has been evident with the United States’ concern that UN agencies could end 
up disbursing U.S. taxpayer money for activities that promote abortions. For 
political scientists, policy implementation also raises issues of defection and 
free-riding, as well as effectiveness. 
 
 60. In-Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 185, ¶ (d), U.N. GAOR, 
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/185 (Mar. 18, 2004). 
 61. See Secretary-General Statement to the General Assembly (Mar. 21, 2005), 
http://www.un.org/largerfreedom/sg-statement.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 62. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Principles Governing IPCC Work (1998), 
available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/ipcc-principles/ipcc-principles.pdf. 
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H. Redelegation 
The authority of redelegation permits the international body to further 
delegate authority to another entity. For international delegations, the other 
entity may be an international organization or a private body such as a 
nongovernmental organization. The World Health Organization and other UN 
implementing agencies, for example, often delegate various in-country tasks by 
subcontracting with various nongovernmental organizations or even with 
private, for-profit organizations. Redelegation may also entail the creation of 
new bodies that emanate from the original international body, such as the IPCC 
or the Working Group on Internet Governance. 
Some forms of authority may be more frequently redelegated than others. 
Implementation delegation is the most common, while redelegation of 
legislative and regulatory authority is rare. One example of redelegating 
regulatory authority is the decision by the European Commission, as noted 
above, to delegate standard-setting to the International Accounting Standards 
Board, a private body.63 Redelegation is not confined to issues of particular 
substance and may occur even in sensitive areas, as illustrated by the UN’s 
redelegation of peace-keeping activities to regional organizations such as 
NATO or specific member states.64 
IV 
EXTENT OF DELEGATION 
We discussed above the types of international bodies that may be granted 
authority, and some of the types of authority that may be granted to these 
bodies. This Part discusses how the extent of a grant of authority can vary 
depending on its legal effect and the degree of independence of the 
international body. 
A. Legal Effect 
An important feature of delegation is its legal effect. Just as a higher degree 
of obligation correlates with a higher level of legalization,65 delegations that 
allow international bodies to create binding legal obligations are more extensive 
than similar delegations of only advisory or agenda-setting authority. This is so 
because the presence of such legal obligations can implicate additional domestic 
and international constraints. In addition, a delegation is greater still if the 
international body has the authority to create binding obligations that have 
domestic legal effect (as is the case, for example, with the European Court of 
Justice), because the international body then has the benefit of domestic 
enforcement machinery. Sometimes the domestic validity of delegations can be 
 
 63. See text accompanying note 27. 
 64. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1244, Annex 2(4) (June 10, 1999) (authorizing NATO to deploy forces in 
Kosovo to maintain security). 
 65. See Abbott et al., supra note 2, at 408–12. 
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affected by their legal status. For example, in a recent decision, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit construed a delegation as nonbinding in order 
to avoid what it perceived to be constitutional concerns.66 
An emphasis on legal effect does not mean that nonbinding delegation is 
insignificant. As research on the concept of “soft law” has illustrated,67 such 
delegation may circumscribe policy autonomy by creating international or 
domestic pressure on governments. Consider, for example, the committee 
established to monitor compliance with the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The committee 
is charged with receiving reports from the states’ parties concerning their efforts 
to comply with the Convention and with making “such general comments on 
the report[s] as it may consider appropriate.”68 These comments often receive 
substantial attention, as when the committee issued a comment in May 2006 
calling on the United States to close down the Guantanamo Bay detention 
facility used to house detainees in the war on terrorism.69 Similarly, the 2004 
advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice concerning the legality of 
Israel’s separation barrier in occupied Palestinian territory involved a 
significant exercise of authority, even though it was not legally binding.70 
Nonbinding standards and codes of conduct can also be important. For 
example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has 
issued guidelines for activities by multinational enterprises,71 and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, established in the 1960s by the World Health 
Organization and the UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization, promulgates 
international food standards.72 
 
 66. See NRDC v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8–9 (D.C. Cir. 2006). 
 67. See Abbott et al., supra note 2. 
 68. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment art. 19, ¶¶ 1, 3, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
 69. See Committee Against Torture, Consideration of Reports Submitted by State Parties Under 
Article 19 of the Convention, Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture, ¶ 
22, UN Doc. CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 18, 2006), available at http://www.ohchr.org/english/ 
bodies/cat/docs/AdvanceVersions/CAT.C.USA.CO.2.pdf (“State party [the United States] should cease 
to detain any person at Guantanamo Bay and close this detention facility . . . .”); Tim Golden, U.S. 
Should Close Prison in Cuba, U.N. Panel Says, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2006, at A1.  
 70. See International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction 
of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (July 9, 2004), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imwp/imwpframe.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). 
 71. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34889_1_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2007). 
 72. See Food and Agricultural Organization, The Codex System: FAO, WHO and the Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/W9114E/W9114e04.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Aug. 30, 2007). The WTO 
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures makes presumptive rules out of these nonbinding 
guidelines. If a state wants to adopt regulations that are higher than the Codex, it must produce 
scientific evidence showing that the regulation is necessary to protect against a risk. This can be difficult 
to do with low-level risks, as the EU learned when it lost the beef-hormones case on precisely this issue. 
See Tim Büthe, The Globalization of Health and Safety Standards: Delegation of Regulatory Authority 
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Even when the decisions or actions of an international body are legally 
binding, their effect will depend on the type of enforcement authority 
associated with the delegation. Thus, the delegation to the UN Security Council 
entails a high legal effect because the Council not only can issue binding 
resolutions but also can enforce these resolutions through a wide range of 
multilateral sanctions, including the use of force. Similarly, the legal effect of 
the delegation to the International Criminal Court is high because it can 
enforce its criminal judgments directly through the strong sanction of 
imprisonment. The legal effect of WTO decisions, while significant, is somewhat 
lower, in that these decisions are subject to enforcement only through the threat 
of sanctions by the prevailing party, which will vary in any given case. Lower 
still is the legal effect of delegation to the International Court of Justice. 
Although ICJ decisions in contentious cases are legally binding, the ICJ has no 
direct means of enforcing the decisions. Prevailing parties can seek enforcement 
of ICJ decisions through the Security Council, but such efforts are subject to 
veto, and the Security Council has never in fact enforced an ICJ decision. Nor, 
unlike European Court of Justice decisions, are ICJ decisions typically 
considered directly enforceable in domestic courts.73 
Figure 2 illustrates how the components of legal effect can vary based on 
whether the output of the international body is legally binding and whether the 
legal obligation is enforceable. Table 2 illustrates how the total legal effect 
results from a combination of these two factors. 
 
 
in the SPS-Agreement of the 1994 Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219 (Winter 2008).  
 73. See generally A. Mark Weisburd, International Courts and American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 877 (2000). 
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Figure 2: Factors Influencing Legal Effect 
 
  
Low                                                                                         High 
Obligation Not legally binding, 
either internationally 
or domestically. 
 Legally binding, both 
internationally and 
domestically. 
 
Enforceability Depends on 
voluntary 
compliance. 
 Strong, direct sanctions, 
such as the use of force, 
criminal punishment, or 
direct national court 
application. 
 
Table 2: Combined Legal Effect as a Function of Obligation and Enforceability 
 
  Enforceability 
  High Low 
High 
High legal effect: 
Security Council, 
European Union. 
Moderate legal effect: 
Human Rights Council. 
Obligation 
 
Low 
Low to moderate legal 
effect: Nontreaty norms 
against nuclear 
proliferation. 
Low legal effect: 
Nontreaty norms against 
use of the death penalty. 
B. Independence of the International Body 
Another factor that affects the extent of delegation is the independence of 
the international body. Independence, in turn, depends on the control 
mechanisms that a state has over the decisionmaking body through its 
representation on the body, the body’s rules and procedures, other institutional 
features such as oversight mechanisms, the permanence of the delegation, and 
authority over finances.74 These attributes may be present in any combination. 
In addition to varying among international bodies, some of them vary as to the 
same international body based on its relationship with the different state-
parties. 
 
 74. Our approach here overlaps to some extent with the list of control mechanisms developed in 
the literature on delegation within the EU, see POLLACK, supra note 18, and with the international-
organization design features identified in Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson & Duncan Snidal, The 
Rational Design of International Institutions, 55 INT’L ORG. 761 (2001), as well as with the control 
mechanisms developed by DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS: A 
TRANSACTION COST POLITICS APPROACH TO POLICY MAKING UNDER SEPARATE POWERS (1999), 
and by JOHN D. HUBER & CHARLES R. SHIPAN, DELIBERATE DISCRETION? THE INSTITUTIONAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTONOMY (2002). 
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Figure 3 illustrates the attributes that affect independence: 
 
Figure 3: Attributes Affecting Independence 
 
  
Low                                                                                            High 
Precision Specific and exhaustively 
defined mandate. 
 
 Vague mandate. 
Oversight Extensive oversight, 
regular reporting 
requirements, tight 
control over resource 
and staff. 
 
 Little oversight, no 
reporting requirements. 
Rules and 
Procedures 
Consent-based 
decisionmaking; 
procedures ensure no 
decisions taken without 
input from all members. 
 
 State does not need to be 
included or informed of 
decisionmaking and 
actions. 
Financial 
Control 
Mechanisms 
Funding voluntary or the 
body is highly dependent 
on additional voluntary 
contributions. 
 Independent sources of 
funding, or funding is 
nested in larger, fairly 
fixed organizational 
resources that hinder 
individual targeting of 
financial restrictions. 
 
Permanence Instant exit permitted. 
Renegotiation very easy. 
 Exit either disallowed or 
highly infeasible. 
Renegotiation impossible 
or very difficult. 
 
One factor that affects the independence of the international body is the 
precision of the grant. Unlike legalization, delegation does not necessarily 
correlate with a higher degree of precision. Indeed, other things being equal, a 
more precise delegation will be more constrained, presenting less room for 
agency slack or diverging interpretations among member states. Thus, one 
reason the delegation to the UN Security Council is so extensive is that it can be 
triggered by the Council’s determination that there has been a “threat to the 
peace,” which is a broad and imprecise standard. Of course, for a particular 
delegation, the subject matter of the delegation may be a more significant factor 
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than precision. For example, the authority of the International Criminal Court 
is defined relatively precisely, but it nevertheless involves a high level of 
delegation, in part because of the subject matter. In some cases precision may 
actually increase the delegation, such as where a formulation adds exclusivity to 
an international body’s mandate. 
States can also limit independence though formal oversight mechanisms: 
institutional checks and balances, such as requirements for approval by the state 
parties; voting rules; and the ability to hire and fire the entity’s staff. As the 
literature on the U.S. Congress has demonstrated, rules and procedures can 
serve as powerful constraints on the use of authority, but they can also result in 
the allocation of power to less-than-obvious bodies, which may be able to use 
gatekeeping procedures and rules to veto actions or force their consideration.75  
Given the multilayered nature of the bodies nested within a given delegation, 
the oversight mechanisms therefore become crucial to the actual impact of any 
grant of authority.76 A delegation that prima facie appears to be in a core issue 
area, such as security, may in reality be so severely circumscribed by oversight 
mechanisms that discretion is minimal. The international body’s independence 
therefore depends on the larger institutional structure, the rules and procedures 
of decisionmaking, and the voice that any given state retains in the body. 
Indeed, some of the more interesting work on international delegation in the 
future may consider exactly the impact of these complex institutional designs. 
For adjudicative delegations, the body’s independence will be affected by 
the jurisdiction of the tribunal as well as by the rules and procedures for the 
appointment and tenure of judges and staff and the extent of state control over 
the salaries and resources. 77 As noted, precision generally reduces the level of 
independence. Keohane and others point out that “the greater the uncertainty 
concerning the proper interpretation or norm in a given case, the more 
potential legal independence it possesses.”78 Tribunals will have the highest 
independence if they have general compulsory jurisdiction, but they will have 
less independence when there is a requirement of separate state consent to have 
the particular subject matter of the dispute resolved by the tribunal. 
Independence is also lower if the jurisdiction of the international tribunal is 
subject to a requirement of exhausting local remedies, or (as is the case for the 
International Criminal Court) to a principle of “complementarity” whereby 
national courts can displace the international tribunal’s jurisdiction. Ad hoc 
arbitration often involves a low level of independence since there is a 
 
 75. See, e.g., Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative 
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (2002). 
 76. Matthew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984). 
 77. See Keohane et al., supra note 36, at 460; see also Eric A. Posner & John C. Yoo, Judicial 
Independence in International Tribunals, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2005); Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-
Marie Slaughter, Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, 
93 CAL. L. REV. 899 (2005). 
 78. Keohane et al., supra note 36, at 461. 
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requirement of state consent on a case-by-case basis, and since some of the 
judges will typically be selected by the states involved. 
For other types of delegated authority, the independence of a given 
international body depends on the rules and nested relationships among the 
different decisionmaking and implementation bodies. As Figure 1 and Table 1 
illustrate, in addition to delegating simultaneously to different bodies within the 
larger framework, an international agreement may also grant different types of 
authority to the different bodies, and each grant of authority may be subject to 
different levels of control by the state. A state’s ability to control delegation to a 
secretariat, for example, is modified by the authority granted to a council or 
conference of parties that oversees the secretariat, and by the rules and 
procedures that guide a state’s ability to influence decisions by these other 
bodies. The overall independence of an international body such as the World 
Health Organization therefore depends ultimately on how much control the 
highest decision organ has over other bodies in the organization and how 
autonomous that decision organ is from the member states. 
Independence varies not only among different types of international 
delegations, but also among countries with respect to the same body, since 
different countries may have a different ability to control the body. In 
institutions such as the World Bank, for example, some countries such as the 
United States have strong controls while others have weak ones. This may be 
due to different allocation of votes, or to different representation on various 
bodies, or, less formally, to different levels of geopolitical power or financial 
contributions through which states may exert other forms of control throughout 
the delegation chain. 
If a state is itself a member of a decision organ of an international body, this 
membership decreases the body’s independence, but it does not eliminate it. 
For example, under the Landmines Convention, the meeting of states’ parties 
can “authorize a fact-finding mission and decide on its mandate by a majority of 
States’ Parties present and voting.”79 The requested state, subject to some 
limitations, has to grant access to all areas and installations under its control.80 
As discussed earlier, states may not be able to control bodies even when they 
hold veto power or when consensus is required. This is especially true if the 
body’s affirmative consent is needed, as is the case with the UN Security 
Council with respect to some uses of military force. If the decisionmaking body 
consists of a subgroup of member states, the body clearly is more autonomous 
vis-à-vis the excluded states. The most autonomous bodies are the classic 
bureaucracies of the UN secretariat or the IMF fund management in which 
states are not members, although the majority of these have oversight bodies 
controlled by states. As pointed out by principal–agent theory, such control is 
diluted by informational asymmetries, which enable shirking or professional 
biases. 
 
 79. Landmines Convention, supra note 26, at art. VIII, ¶ 8. 
 80. Id. ¶ 14. 
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A very common type of control mechanism is the ability of states to 
withhold funding or other resources from an international body. An obvious 
example is the staffing of peacekeeping missions. Whereas the UN Security 
Council may use its delegated authority to mandate military action, such 
mandates cannot be implemented without troop commitments, which by 
tradition are ad hoc and therefore highly vulnerable to the preferences of 
individual states. Even mandatory contributions to international organizations 
may be withheld, as the United Nations experienced in the 1990s when the 
United States refused to pay its dues until the organization reformed. Although 
their monetary impact is lower, even small states can send effective protest 
signals by withholding funding. Conversely, states can also enhance their 
delegation by providing international bodies with additional voluntary 
contributions of money, staff, or other resources. In addition to individual state 
funding decisions, states can collectively reduce the level of contributions if they 
want to abrogate the power of runaway bodies. In other cases, states may want 
to fund international bodies in advance so as to place limits on their own ability 
to interfere with the body’s decisionmaking power. One such case is the Iran–
U.S. Claims Tribunal, in which the two states allocated funds to allow the 
tribunal to function as independently as possible.81 
A final factor affecting the independence of an international body is the 
permanence of the delegation. Permanence refers to how easy it is for a state to 
extricate itself from the delegation or from select provisions. This factor 
encompasses both the duration of the delegation (for example, the Kyoto 
Protocol sets a target only for a certain period, and ad hoc arbitral tribunals 
may exist only for one case);82 how easy it is for a state to renegotiate the terms 
of the delegation; and the ability to exit, which varies in terms of the amount of 
notice required and other conditions in the agreement.83 Renegotiation, 
although legally possible, may be complicated by the rules and procedures of 
the delegation, as well as by the relative power relationships between states. If 
all states agree that a delegation has gone awry, renegotiation is obviously much 
easier than if a state finds over time that it has become a preference outlier. Exit 
may also be complicated by the degree to which a state’s participation in the 
delegation is embedded in other arrangements. Thus, although exit may be 
feasible legally, in practice it may be difficult. This would presumably be the 
case with withdrawal from the Euro, which is embedded in the monetary policy 
of the EU, and for withdrawal from the European Court of Human Rights, 
which is embedded in Council of Europe membership. Indeed, since 
participation in most international organizations is not à la carte, it presents 
states with a set of tradeoffs that may make exit undesirable even if states are 
displeased with particular institutional features. By contrast, exit is easier for 
 
 81. See Iran-United States Claims Tribunal, http://www.iusct.org/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 82. See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 
11, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22, available at  http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 83. See Helfer, supra note 13. 
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stand-alone delegations that are not embedded in other commitments or 
membership—such as the dispute-resolution protocol to the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations, from which the United States withdrew in 
2005.84 
V 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 
In deciding whether to delegate authority to international institutions, states 
will weigh the benefits against the costs. In this Part, the nature of the benefits 
and costs associated with different types of delegation are considered, as are 
various factors that may influence the levels of these different categories of 
benefits and costs. 
A. Benefits of Delegation 
Scholars have made significant progress in identifying the benefits of 
international cooperation.85 Many of these benefits derive more specifically 
from the international delegation inherent in much of this cooperation.86 First, 
states can benefit from the specialization that may develop when they delegate 
to bodies that can gather complex knowledge and generate expertise from the 
execution of repeated tasks.87 The benefits of such expertise are particularly 
apparent in bodies like the WHO, which by its vast collection of state 
knowledge is invaluable in developing emergency strategies for fighting the 
spread of viruses such as the recent and deadly bird-flu strain.88 Similarly, the 
international police organization Interpol facilitates pooling of knowledge 
about drugs, human trafficking, and other crimes.89 The level of expertise that 
this organization can attain is thus greater than what any one state could create 
alone. 
In international cooperation, it is often the act of delegation that enhances 
the credibility of international commitments and thus facilitates international 
cooperation. When the core of an international agreement rests on a set of 
behavioral commitments that states may have incentives to evade, delegating 
authority to bodies that can monitor and perhaps enforce the commitments 
reduces incentives to renege on these commitments. This is the role of many 
 
 84. See Charles Lane, U.S. Quits Pact Used in Capital Cases, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2005, at A1. 
 85. See, e.g., ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE 
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1992); LISA L. MARTIN, COERCIVE COOPERATION: EXPLAINING 
MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS (1992). 
 86. For a recent summary of the benefits of delegation, see HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13–
20. See also Oona Hathaway, International Delegation and State Sovereignty, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 115 (Winter 2008).  
 87. See HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 13–15. 
 88. See World Health Organization, Avian Influenza, http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_ 
influenza/en/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2008). 
 89. See generally Interpol, Interpol’s Core Four Functions, http://www.interpol.int/Public/ 
icpo/about.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2007). 
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oversight committees created in areas such as human rights and arms control. 
Such monitoring enables states to commit more credibly to cooperation and 
therefore overcome classic time-inconsistency problems. 
Delegation also can be used for the resolution of disputes, which in turn 
allows states to continue cooperation. This is naturally the objective of direct 
delegation of dispute-resolution authority, but it may also be a more indirect 
benefit of other forms of delegation. For example, collective bodies can be a 
useful forum for resolving disputes among states by allowing discussion and 
resolution according to preset rules, and specialized agencies can provide 
information that may be useful in addressing disputes. In many agreements, the 
“Collective of the Whole” or the “Conference of the Parties” serves such a 
function. 
In addition, it is often some form of delegation that reduces transaction 
costs of interstate cooperation. When states are unable to work out all the 
details of their cooperative agreements, they benefit from delegating authority 
to bodies that can coordinate solutions and make running policy decisions so 
that states do not have to continually renegotiate. This benefit is evident with 
specialized bodies such as the International Maritime Organization and in the 
area of food standards, in which delegation facilitates detailed but necessary 
regulation. 
Finally, delegation can enhance the ability of states to control movements of 
goods, persons, pollutants, ideas, and diseases across their borders. This is what 
Stephen Krasner has labeled “interdependence sovereignty.”90 Controlling such 
cross-border movements in turn enhances the ability of states to control 
domestic activity.91 
The different types of delegated authority carry these benefits to varying 
degrees. Adjudicative delegation can generate many of them. It creates gains 
from specialization, enhances credibility by assisting in the monitoring and 
enforcement of agreements, and inherently can resolve disputes, enabling 
continued cooperation. The decisions of adjudicative institutions may also help 
solve future coordination dilemmas and reduce transaction costs by assisting 
states in the implementation of their agreements because they provide guidance 
on the interpretation and expectations of the agreements. 
Regulatory authority likewise provides gains from specialization. This 
specialization is valuable because it helps states coordinate policies by filling in 
the many gaps in their existing agreements. States also benefit from delegating 
legislative and agenda-setting authority to collective bodies because this allows 
them a forum for negotiating solutions that can extend the scope or duration of 
their cooperation. Granting monitoring and enforcement authority naturally 
benefits states by providing those functions and thus enhancing the credibility 
of their commitments, but it also generates specialization in the body that may 
 
 90. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 12 (1999). 
 91. See Kal Raustiala, Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law, 6 J. INT’L 
ECON. L. 841, 857–62 (2003). 
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further facilitate these tasks. States benefit from delegating policy-
implementation authority and research-and-advice authority because these 
engender specialization and help states to collectively implement policies or 
pool their knowledge. 
The benefits of delegation also vary with the issue area. Although it is 
difficult for states to cooperate on some issue areas, such as security, criminal 
adjudication, and international trade, the benefits can be proportionately large 
if states can do so. Nevertheless, it does not follow that areas that are less 
sensitive in terms of state sovereignty necessarily provide lower benefits from 
delegation. Indeed, delegating authority to regulate and implement policies on 
air-traffic rules or postal cooperation, while relatively uncontroversial, can yield 
significant social benefits for states and their citizens. Moreover, because the 
costs of these delegations are fairly low, the net benefits can be particularly 
large. 
The benefits from delegation do not, however, necessarily depend on 
whether the delegation is legally binding. That is, delegation is not by definition 
more beneficial because it is legally binding, although that might be the case in 
some instances. Making a delegation legally binding may be particularly 
unnecessary when states do not have an incentive to evade their commitments 
or otherwise escape their obligations. Moreover, it is possible that states may be 
more likely to rely on delegation when it is not legally binding. Thus, the 
benefits of nonbinding dispute resolution could actually be greater than that of 
binding dispute-resolution authority, if states would be more likely to use it. 
Nonbinding regulatory authority might also yield common policies more easily, 
and states might be more wiling to accept and implement such regulation. 
Overall, the usefulness of legally binding delegation depends on the structure of 
the underlying cooperation problem.92 It is therefore not possible to generalize 
that benefits from delegation by definition are greater for legally binding 
delegation. 
B. Costs 
International delegations can also impose various costs on states. Because a 
delegation by definition entails a grant of authority, an international delegation 
can lead to reductions in state autonomy through displacement of its 
decisionmaking or control.93 Some scholars have referred to these reductions in 
autonomy as “sovereignty costs.”94 The term can be misleading, however, 
 
 92. See generally Arthur Stein, Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World, 36 
INT’L ORG. 299 (1982) (discussing the nature, development, changes, and breakdown of regimes). 
 93. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 
INT’L ORG. 421, 436–38 (2000); Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 INT’L ORG. 217, 227 (2000). 
 94. See, e.g., Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 436–37 (discussing the concept of “sovereignty 
costs” and noting that these costs can “range from simple differences in outcome on particular issues, to 
loss of authority over decision making in an issue-area, to more fundamental encroachments on state 
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because international delegations can also be seen as an exercise of sovereignty, 
since one of the recognized legal attributes of sovereignty is the capacity to 
engage in foreign relations, including the capacity to conclude binding 
international agreements that entail delegation.95 Moreover, as discussed above, 
international delegations can enhance the ability of a state to control its 
borders, which is an attribute of sovereignty.96 
In addition to autonomy costs, international delegations may require the 
state to compromise its preferred policy outcome.97 This compromise is required 
both because the state will need to coordinate with other states that may have 
different preferred policy outcomes, and, as elaborated by principal–agent 
theory, because there may be divergence between the state’s preferences and 
those of the staff of the international institution.98 
International delegations also increase the costs of noncompliance with 
international commitments. Indeed, that is also one of their goals. International 
delegations can serve as focal points for the imposition of collective sanctions, 
whether they are reputational, economic, or military. The WTO, for example, 
sets up a formal mechanism through which retaliatory sanctions can be 
imposed.99 Research has shown that international sanctions are more effective 
when conducted through an international organization.100 
Finally, international delegations can impose opportunity costs in terms of 
the use of resources. By contributing financial resources to an organization, or 
dedicating personnel to staff or interact with the organization, a state forfeits 
the opportunity to use those resources for other purposes. The organization 
may also be inefficient in its use of the resources, with the result that an activity 
may cost more when accomplished through a delegation. 
The extent to which a state incurs any of these costs will vary with the type 
of delegated authority. Several of the different types of delegations may 
produce shifts in decisionmaking authority, and, relatedly, potential 
compromises of policy preferences. This is likely to be greatest for legislative 
authority that is binding and not subject to individual state ratification, and for 
adjudicative authority that is enforceable through direct effects in the domestic 
legal system of a state. Some types of monitoring and enforcement delegation, 
 
sovereignty”); Moravcsik, supra note 93, at 227 (defining “sovereignty cost” as “the surrender of 
national discretion”). 
 95. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 201 (1987) (“[A] 
state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent population . . . and that engages in, or has 
the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities.”). This is part of what Stephen 
Krasner refers to as “international legal sovereignty.” See KRASNER, supra note 90, at 14–20. 
 96. See supra Part V.A. 
 97. See David A. Lake & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Logic of Delegation to International 
Organizations, in HAWKINS ET AL., supra note 3, at 341, 366; David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, 
Sovereignty and Delegation in International Organizations, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77 (Winter 
2008).  
 98. See Lake & McCubbins, supra note 97. 
 99. See World Trade Organization, Understanding the WTO: Settling Disputes, 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/disp1_e.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2008). 
 100. See generally MARTIN, supra note 85. 
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particularly if they involve physical intrusion in the territory of the state, may 
also reduce state autonomy. On a lesser level, there may also be shifts in 
decisionmaking power when states delegate regulatory authority, especially if 
the regulatory decisions take effect without ratification. The delegation of 
agenda-setting power may also influence decisionmaking processes when the 
international body can obligate states to consider certain legislation. This is the 
case when, for example, the International Labour Organization can create new 
treaties that member states must consider.101 Even if they do not shift formal 
decisionmaking powers, legislative, regulatory, adjudicative, and agenda-setting 
authority may allow international bodies to bring attention to issues and thus 
influence domestic decisionmaking indirectly. This is also the case when states 
appoint bodies to provide advice and research, because these bodies thus obtain 
a platform from which to influence debates. 
Costs of noncompliance are a byproduct of the delegation of 
decisionmaking powers. Such costs have long been studied by political scientists 
who note that such noncompliance may carry not only direct costs such as fines 
or expulsion from organizations, but also bring indirect costs to the state 
through the possible damage to its reputation as a credible cooperation partner. 
These costs are most likely to occur when the state has delegated legislative, 
adjudicative, or regulatory authority. However, delegating monitoring and 
enforcement authority may also result in noncompliance costs, mostly of a 
reputational nature if the state fails to provide the required information or 
cooperate with international monitoring authorities. 
Opportunity costs of expended resources occur in some minimal form in 
connection with all delegation that entails any kind of administrative apparatus. 
These administrative costs aside, the most significant resource opportunity costs 
are usually associated with implementation authority or with the types of 
authority that may, in themselves, incur expensive administrative costs, such as 
adjudicative authority or research-and-advice authority. For example, ad hoc 
tribunals may be expensive to operate, as may international research facilities 
such as the European Organization for Nuclear Research. 
The level of each of these opportunity costs depends on the factors that also 
determine the extent of the delegation. First, the costs will intensify with the 
independence of the international body and the legal effect of the delegation. 
Independent bodies are harder to control, and this makes it more difficult for 
the state to assure that the body’s policies align with state preferences. The 
greater the legal effect of a delegation, the costlier it will also be for states in 
terms of either reputational costs flowing from noncompliance, or foregone 
policy options flowing from reduced decisionmaking powers. 
In addition, the magnitude of the costs will vary depending on the issue area 
of the delegation. For historical, cultural, and functional reasons, states will tend 
to perceive some issues as more closely related to their sovereignty than other 
 
 101. See Helfer, supra note 56. 
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issues. The costs of delegation are highest when issues touch on elements of 
Westphalian sovereignty such as territory or relations between a state and its 
citizens.102 Delegations on security issues are particularly costly because they 
relate to the preservation of the state. Thus, delegations of military-command 
authority (such as allowing foreign or international officials to direct national 
troops) entail relatively high costs because such a delegation relates closely to 
national security and the protection of a state’s citizens. 
A related consideration is whether the delegation overlaps or conflicts with 
traditional exercises of domestic authority. The costs of delegation are higher 
for subjects that have traditionally been regulated by the state, such as criminal 
law and punishment, family relationships, and religious freedom. In contrast, 
delegations on issues relating to international waters, the arctic regions, or outer 
space refer to common-pool resources and thus imply less of a restriction on 
traditional national prerogatives, reducing any costs. Indeed, on some common-
pool resources, states may enjoy benefits only to the extent that they become 
entitled to assert authority where no such confirmed right previously existed. 
Similarly, the delegation costs also depend on the scope and range of the 
issue areas involved. The World Trade Organization, for example, has a broad 
range of issue areas because it addresses virtually all trade issues, not just 
isolated sectors. The delegation to the World Health Organization is of 
similarly broad scope, while the delegation in the Montreal Protocol is narrowly 
focused on ozone-depleting pollutants. For adjudication, an important factor 
relating to scope of authority concerns not only the type of cases that fall within 
the jurisdiction of the court, but also whether the tribunal can hear claims by, or 
operate against, individuals.103 This is true, for example, with the International 
Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights, but not of the ICJ. 
Other things being equal, broader delegations entail higher potential costs. 
The costs of different types of delegation will also vary among states. Some 
states may invest fewer resources in an organization, thus clearly reducing their 
opportunity costs of resources. States with strong internal mechanisms for 
implementing international obligations may also find that, in practice, such 
obligations entail higher noncompliance costs than for states without such 
mechanisms.104 The costs of a delegation can also vary between states because 
some states may have refrained from ratifying protocols or optional provisions 
such that they have in fact delegated less authority than other states. A classic 
example is whether states have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
ICJ.105 
 
 102. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 437, 440; see also KRASNER, supra note 90, at 20–25 
(discussing Westphalian sovereignty). 
 103. For more on access, see Keohane et al., supra note 36. 
 104. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 428. 
 105. States’ parties to the ICJ Statute “may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory 
ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, 
the jurisdiction of the Court . . . .” Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 2, June 26, 
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php? 
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The most important variation in the costs that different states may incur 
from delegation, however, depends on what a state’s preferences and policies 
would have been in the absence of the delegation. In practice, states do not 
have equally broad ranges of available policy options. By delegating to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency, the Dominican Republic may in theory 
accept the same restrictions on development of nuclear weapons as Iran. Since 
the Dominican Republic would not be capable of or have interests in 
developing nuclear weapons, however, in reality this delegation is much costlier 
for Iran. Similarly, the International Criminal Court poses lower real costs for 
states that, unlike the United States, do not regularly engage in significant 
military operations.106 
The policy costs depend further on the configuration of preferences among 
states on any given issue. It is costlier to delegate when preferences diverge 
because the international bodies are more likely to exercise discretion in 
controversial ways. It is another matter, however, when state preferences are 
closely aligned, either because all states are facing a similar problem, or because 
the underlying problem is mostly one of coordination on technical matters. 
When there are greater preference alignments, it is less likely that a state will be 
a preference outlier, and the bodies to which states grant authority are likely to 
have preferences that are more aligned with states as well, thus reducing the 
expected costs due to slack.107 
Finally, the different costs of delegation can change over time. A good 
example is the role of the International Court of Justice in deciding disputes 
arising under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Vienna 
Convention). In the late 1960s, the United States agreed in a treaty to allow the 
ICJ to have jurisdiction over Vienna Convention disputes.108 Most provisions in 
the Vienna Convention concern interstate issues such as the scope of consular 
immunity. One of the provisions in the Convention, however, refers to a right of 
foreign nationals to receive certain types of notice when they are arrested in a 
party country.109 Starting in the late 1990s, the ICJ began relying on this 
provision to decide cases relating to U.S. criminal procedure in death-penalty 
cases involving foreign nationals.110 This development substantially increased the 
 
p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited Sept. 2, 2007). Currently, sixty-five states accept this jurisdiction. See 
International Court of Justice, States Entitled to Appear Before the Court, http://www.icj-
cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=1&sp3=a (last visited Sept. 2, 2007). 
 106. See generally Jack L. Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 89 (2003). 
 107. Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 440–41. 
 108. See Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 168, 596 U.N.T.S. 487, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963_disputes.pdf. 
 109. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, ¶ 1(b), Apr. 24, 1963, T.I.A.S. 6820, 596 
U.N.T.S. 261, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/9_2_1963.pdf  
(“[S]aid authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights.”). 
 110. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), Provisional 
Measures, 1998 I.C.J. 248 (Apr. 9); LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. Rep. 466 (June 27); Case 
Concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 ICJ Rep. 12 (Mar. 31). 
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decision cost of the arrangement for the United States, and eventually the 
United States withdrew from the jurisdictional treaty.111 
VI 
QUESTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to providing a common vocabulary, a typology should stimulate 
thinking, in this case about the nature and consequences of international 
delegation. The typology presented here raises a number of questions. As an 
initial matter, the typology reveals the need for additional empirical work 
concerning the types and incidence of international delegations, and the nature 
of the relationship between states and international institutions. This article has 
illustrated the typology with examples, but it has not systematically assessed 
how frequently states actually delegate the various kinds of authority, or the 
extent to which states control the independence of the bodies they create. And 
although the literature on the rational design of international institutions has 
begun to examine the incidence of various basic features of international 
organizations,112 it is not yet known how many international bodies have been 
granted different types of authority. Barbara Koremenos makes an important 
first contribution to this question in her article for this issue.113 Likewise, 
although there has been some work on the frequency of certain types of control 
mechanisms, such as the ability of states to exit an agreement,114 that sort of 
systematic study is rare. Debates in international relations and law about how 
much delegation there is and how much it matters are, therefore, largely 
anecdotal. Hopefully the typology presented here will facilitate additional 
empirical research, as well as a more precise consideration of the nature of state 
delegations of authority. 
The typology may also aid the study of the extent to which variations in 
benefits and costs actually explain state behavior with respect to delegations. 
Although several studies examine why some states may ratify various legal 
agreements or participate in international cooperation, studies that explain 
participation in international delegation more specifically are lacking. From a 
rational-choice perspective, cost-benefit calculations should be important 
determinants. Thus, one would expect states that anticipate the costs of 
delegation to outweigh its benefits to refrain from delegating. From a more 
constructivist perspective, however, one might also expect norms and beliefs to 
influence delegation decisions. For example, some states may be particularly 
averse to delegation of dispute-resolution authority, and this may explain their 
 
 111. See supra text accompanying note 86. The European Court of Justice and the International 
Labour Organization present additional examples of how an international institution may expand its 
authority over time. See ALTER, supra note 50; Helfer, supra note 56. 
 112. See, for example, the special issue of International Organizations on this topic, 55 INT’L ORG. 
761 (2001). 
 113. See Barbara Koremenos, When, What, and Why Do States Choose to Delegate?, 71 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Winter 2008).  
 114. See Helfer, supra note 13. 
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lower participation in some international cooperation. It would also be 
interesting to explore the extent to which the delegation inherent in any 
particular international agreement can explain states’ decisions to sign and 
ratify the agreement. Perhaps some states, for various reasons, are more 
delegation-averse, and perhaps this can explain variation in overall 
international cooperation. 
In addition, just as scholars have argued that soft law may be 
consequential,115 this article’s inclusion of nonbinding delegation may stimulate 
thinking about “soft delegation.” Whereas the study of soft law has revealed 
that nonbinding commitments can have powerful repercussions for state 
behavior, this article suggests that soft delegation—the granting of nonbinding 
authority to international actors—can be similarly powerful. The actions of 
many of these international bodies circumscribe states’ policy autonomy by 
creating international or domestic pressure on those governments. This can 
occur in a variety of ways, including through nonbinding arbitration, 
committees charged with receiving and commenting on reports from the states 
parties, and the issuance of advisory legal opinions and nonbinding standards 
and codes. 
The typology also raises questions about the multi-layered nature of 
delegation. In any given international agreement, states simultaneously 
delegate different types of authority to different bodies, which enjoy different 
degrees of independence.116 Although this is not new, the inclusion here of 
collectives, or subgroups of states, is not only a more realistic portrayal of 
delegation, but it also invites more complex theorizing about the locus of 
power. A narrow focus on third parties tends to limit theorizing to principal–
agent approaches that concentrate on the relationship between states and large 
international bureaucracies. When states delegate authority internationally, 
however, managing that relationship is only part of their concern. Of equal or 
greater concern is that decisions and actions will be taken jointly with other 
states. 
This article’s broader typology can cast light on how different institutional 
environments locate power differently within different international 
organizations, and thus why certain international organizations tend to become 
associated with particular bodies within their systems. The World Bank, for 
example, is often associated with its board, and the UN with its Security 
Council. The degree of overall delegation by any one state to a given 
international organization is also determined by the interrelationship of the 
different interacting bodies within the organization. Discussion of international 
delegation and the accountability and legitimacy of international organizations 
may also benefit from properly identifying the controls that different bodies 
exert within organizations. 
 
 115. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 93, at 421. 
 116. See supra Part III.B. 
01__BRADLEY_KELLEY.DOC 6/9/2008  7:53:54 AM 
34 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 71:1 
Contrary to prior work on international delegation, which tends to speak of 
authority as uniform, the typology also draws attention to the fact that states 
delegate authority of different types. This raises questions about the activities of 
different bodies with delegated authority. Many of the first questions are 
descriptive, because scholars have not explored this variety. The descriptive 
inquiries, however, can then lead to more causal analysis. For example, 
although states sometimes grant legislative powers in practice, how often do 
international bodies amend their underlying treaties or issue binding directives? 
If we do not often see legislative actions, why is this authority included? If we 
do see legislative actions, why do these come about? Are those decisions driven 
by powerful states? Do they result from emergent normative discourse? Who 
governs the formal reshaping of international bodies through legislation, and 
how does that vary across institutions? Understanding the institutional change 
is important for studies of global governance and legitimacy and accountability, 
and they can be aided by inquiries into the uses and controls of different types 
of authorities. 
Equally interesting might be research into the delegation of other types of 
authority, such as formal agenda-setting power. Although few bodies have the 
agenda-setting power of the European Commission, many international bodies 
do exercise meaningful, formal agenda-setting power when, for example, their 
members are required to bring conventions adopted by the body before their 
domestic authorities. When and how do some international bodies manage to 
exercise their agenda-setting power effectively? How is the agenda-setting 
power of international bodies influenced by institutional features such as who 
may propose an initiative, the voting rules, and the rules governing 
amendments? What factors determine the magnitude of the agenda-setting 
power of international bodies? Does it rise with the complexity of a subject 
matter or with the divergence in preferences of member states? The exploration 
of the legal and practical causes and consequences of other types of authority 
may yield similarly interesting questions. 
Another set of questions about types of authority relates to institutional 
design. Scholars have begun to study why states design international 
organizations the way they do. This question is hardly complete without 
considering the different types of authority delegated. What are the 
relationships between the different types of authority? Do certain types of 
authority tend to “go together,” or are some types of authority mutually 
exclusive? Is it, for example, the case that bodies with great regulatory power 
tend not to have enforcement power? How do the types of authorities vary with 
the degree of legal obligation inherent in the underlying treaty? Although our 
typology has grouped them together, what is the relationship between 
monitoring authority and enforcement authority, and to what extent can 
01__BRADLEY_KELLEY.DOC 6/9/2008  7:53:54 AM 
Winter 2008] THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL DELEGATION 35 
monitoring authority substitute for lack of formal enforcement authority?117 Do 
some issue areas tend to be associated with adjudicative authority, while others 
tend to be associated with monitoring authority? Or can we better understand 
the types of authority delegated by looking at the underlying structure of the 
collaboration problem, regardless of issue area? Likely it is a combination 
thereof, but specifying the types of authority may help us make the connections. 
The typology may also have implications for considerations of domestic 
politics. States are represented in most international institutions solely by 
executive agents. Nevertheless, these institutions increasingly engage in a 
variety of legislative and regulatory activities, thus posing questions about their 
effect on domestic distributions of authority between legislative and executive 
bodies. In addition, the rise of international adjudicative institutions may affect 
the authority of domestic courts within their systems. Another structural issue 
posed by international delegations is their effect on federal systems of 
government, such as the one in the United States.118 Questions can also be raised 
about the connections between international delegations and interest-group 
politics, and the effects of such delegations on domestic political bargaining. Do 
certain types of bodies or certain types of delegated authority lend themselves 
to greater influence by domestic political groups? May international delegations 
sometimes enhance or decrease the power of domestic actors?119 
Furthermore, the typology presents a number of issues relating to the legal 
implications of international delegations. As the typology makes clear, the legal 
effect of a delegation is a significant factor affecting its cost. The cost is 
particularly high when there is domestic as well as international legal effect. 
This consideration may influence how domestic institutions construe the output 
of international institutions. U.S. courts, for example, may construe 
international orders and decisions as “non-self-executing” in the U.S. legal 
system.120 In addition, as international institutions increasingly handle regulatory 
duties, questions may be raised about the extent to which domestic legal 
controls that mirror those governing domestic regulatory entities should be 
imposed.121 
 
 117. For a discussion of international institutions and compliance focusing on monitoring 
arrangements, see generally Xinyuan Dai, Information Systems of Treaty Regimes, 54 WORLD POL. 405 
(July 2002). 
 118. See Neil S. Siegel, International Delegations and the Values of Federalism, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 93 (Winter 2008).  
 119. See, e.g., Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Negotiate or Litigate? Effects of WTO 
Judicial Delegation on U.S. Trade Politics, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257 (Winter 2008).  
 120. See, e.g., U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (“We find 
in these clauses no intent to vest citizens who reside in a U.N. member nation with authority to enforce 
an ICJ decision against their own government.”); Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1976) (“[The provisions at issue] do not by their terms confer rights upon individual citizens.”). See 
generally Curtis A. Bradley, International Delegations, the Structural Constitution, and Non-Self-
Execution, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1587–95 (2003). 
 121. See, e.g., Esty, supra note 53; Richard B. Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law: A Model for Global 
Administrative Law?, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63 (Summer/Autumn 2005). 
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By identifying the different types of delegated authority and the various 
factors influencing the overall level of delegation, the typology may also be 
helpful in identifying more precisely what types of delegations raise 
constitutional or other legal concerns. In the United States, these concerns will 
be translated into doctrinal considerations such as the formal processes for 
making law and treaties, the nondelegation doctrine, restrictions imposed by 
the Appointments Clause, limitations on the extent to which adjudicative 
functions can be delegated to “non-Article III courts,” and federalism 
restraints. Such concerns may in turn affect the legal controls that the United 
States places on international delegations—through treaty provisions, 
reservations, implementing legislation, and other mechanisms. 
In exploring these issues, there are obvious opportunities for interaction and 
collaboration between legal and political-science scholars. A full political 
assessment of the features of international delegation may need to take account 
of the legal environments in which these delegations take place. It may be 
useful to consider, for example, the extent to which domestic or international 
legal considerations influence the incidence and structure of international 
delegations, and the extent to which there are legal mechanisms for controlling 
or terminating a delegation. Social-science assessments of the benefits and costs 
of international delegation, and their effect on state behavior and the operation 
of domestic politics, may in turn be relevant to legal considerations of their 
proper design and validity. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
International delegations are a significant and growing component of 
international relations, and they implicate a number of important legal and 
political questions. In the past, analysis of the delegation component of 
international cooperation has often been limited to the study of international 
bureaucracies or has simply been subsumed within a broader cooperation 
framework. As a result, the causes and consequences of international 
delegation remain understudied. This article has identified various types of 
international delegations as well as factors that can affect their costs and 
benefits. We hope that these conceptual distinctions will facilitate additional 
consideration of the legal and political dynamics of international delegation. 
